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The last decade of conflict in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and other contingency operations has brought about 
many technical advances for our Soldiers. In order to get new capabilities fielded quickly, 
the traditional Department of Defense acquisition cycle was modified to achieve rapid 
fieldings. This paper examines how requirements are developed for programs of record 
(POR) and rapid acquisitions (RA), and then how test and evaluation (T&E) is 
administered to each. A materiel release is required for any equipment, regardless of how 
the requirement is generated. POR that are transitioned from RA still must go through the 
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process, but the path may be 
shortened if the gains from the RI are capitalized upon. After examination of two POR 
that began as RA, we found clear examples of how to capitalize on the testing that 
occurred during the fielding of an RA. We recommend that all RA conduct T&E in a 
manner that provides usable data for decision makers and also to inform future POR. We 
further recommend that T&E be included during R&D phases of acquisition to reduce 
T&E burden in later phases of programs. 
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A. RESEARCH INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide an overview of the research topic starting with a 
background on how the Department of Defense (DOD) and, more specifically, how the 
Army provides materiel solutions for their Soldiers. According to the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA 
[ALT]),  
the Mission of the Army Acquisition professional field is to provide 
our Soldiers a decisive advantage in any mission by maintaining quality 
acquisition professionals to develop, acquire, field, and sustain the 
world’s best equipment and services through efficient leveraging of 
technologies and capabilities to meet current and future Army needs. 
The reason for this is to generate and prepare the best equipped Army 
that maintains the technological advantage and capabilities against any 
threat in any environment. (Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA [ALT], n.d., p. 1) 
The Army Acquisition process will be examined in this paper in two ways: 
through the lens of the traditional acquisition process utilizing the Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development System (JCIDS) and through the vantage point of rapid 
equipping through joint urgent operational needs statements (JUONS) and Operational 
Needs Statements (ONS). In addition, the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition 
(CDRT) process will be examined to understand better how the Army transitions Rapid 
Acquisition (RA) programs to enduring Programs of Records (POR). We will also 
address the Army Materiel Release process that includes several different mechanisms 
such as Full Materiel Release (FMR) and the Urgent Materiel Release (UMR).  
After describing the acquisition avenues available to the Army the purpose, 
importance, and criticality of Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities will be explored. This 
background information will establish a relevant baseline that can be used throughout our 
research to identify potential risk and or short comings associated with RA as they move 
to enduring capabilities. We used two specific research questions to analyze the data and 
apply it to our problem statement: 
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1. Did the abbreviated T&E requirements in an RA environment dilute the 
important role of the “honest broker” that a T&E team should play in an 
acquisition program? 
2. What are the long-term effects on programs from the manner that T&E is 
conducted to meet RI timelines?  
This report will address our thesis topic concerning T&E in an RA environment. 
Our research protocols and research rational will also be provided. The following 
sections provide background acquisition information for requirements generation, the role 
of T&E, and the NS-E transition process. 
1. Requirements Generation 
The DOD is dependent on equipment and technology. As technology develops 
faster the DOD has developed a system to determine which technology is used. The 
JCIDS process is used to assist the DOD in requirements generation. 
JCIDS is a need driven joint capabilities-based requirements generation 
process. The objective is to develop a balanced and synchronized 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, 
Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solution approach that is 
affordable, militarily useful, supportable by outside agencies, and based 
on mature technology that is demonstrated in a relevant operational or 
laboratory environment. (Army Force Management School, 2013, p. 6) 
The JCIDS process uses a deliberate, structured, and thorough process to generate 
requirements (illustrated in the first portion of Figure 1, leading to the full acquisition 
process) and can be viewed as the kickoff of a new Army acquisition program. Several 
years may be spent on up front analysis to ensure DOTMLPF-P considerations are 
adequately addressed and appropriate steps are taken during T&E planning and 
execution. 
JUONS are created by Combatant Commanders (CCDR) in order to identify a 
multi-service capability shortfall for a force preparing to deploy or those currently 
deployed. This process is not designed to circumvent the JCIDS process but used in a 
limited manner to provide a rapid capability for a very specific purpose. Field 
Commanders identify capability gaps and forward those gaps to the CCDR’s staff.  
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Figure 1.  JCIDS Process Overview 
 
From R. James, personal communication, January 9, 2015. 
The staff then determines whether the requirement meets the threshold of a 
JUONS. If all the requirements for a JUONS are met, the CCDR submits the JUONS 
formally to the Joint Staff for action. The Joint Force Structure, Resources, and 
Assessment Directorate (Joint Staff J8) either validates or rejects the JUONS. If 
validated, the JUONS is sent to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) for resourcing 
and action. The JRAC assigns the action to an organization to fulfill the need and sustain 
it for up to 24 months following fielding. 
The Army ONS process is used when operational commanders, in the grade of O6 
and higher, identify a capability gap. The commander’s unit must be deployed, preparing 
to deploy or a part of a high priority unit. The unit produces an ONS and begins the 
process by submitting it through the Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) 
system. The request then moves through the approval process. If the unit is deployed, the 
request is routed through deployed unit’s chain of command to the Army Service 
Component Commander (ASCC). 
Non-deployed units submit requests through the major command to which they 
are assigned. Once the ONS is approved by the respective ASCC, it moves on to 
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Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
(G3) for validation. If validated, the ONS moves to HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Resource Management (G8) for resourcing. Resourcing is the process of providing 
budget authority to a PM for execution. If resourcing is available, the validated request is 
forwarded with funding to the acquisition community for action. A program manager is 
assigned the requirement and allocated resources to carry out with an acquisition plan. 
2. Role of Test and Evaluation  
Test and Evaluation plays a key role in acquisition programs. “Testing is the 
process of obtaining, verifying, or providing data to determine whether an item meets or 
fails to meet defined objectives. Evaluation is the analysis of data to assess progress of 
design, performance, supportability, or other required attributes” (W. Chadwick, personal 
communication, January 16, 2014). The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) states 
that 
a rigorous and efficient T&E program provides early knowledge of 
developmental and operational issues. Correcting these issues early 
enough can mitigate risks of cost overruns and schedule slippages, and 
can ultimately contribute to delivery of effective and suitable weapons, 
Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS) to 
the Warfighters in a timely manner. (Defense Acquisition University, 
2015a, p. 773) 
The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) strives “to be a team of highly 
skilled test and evaluation professionals focused on informing equipping decisions for 
today’s and tomorrow’s warfighter” (ATEC, n.d.). Army policy assigns ATEC as the 
responsible organization for Operational Utility Assessments.  
Under an RA environment with an abbreviated fielding schedule, the systems 
engineers, test leads, the product managers, and the entire Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
needs to ensure that reduced T&E events still provide the appropriate level of data, 
analysis, and technical confidence that the product satisfies user needs.  
 5 
3. Materiel Release 
The Army uses the materiel release process to ensure that equipment is safe, 
suitable, and logistically supportable. Army Regulation (AR) 700–142 (Type 
Classification, Materiel Release, Fielding, and Transfer) establishes policy and 
prescribes procedures for the Army’s Type Classification (TC), Materiel Release (MR), 
material fielding, and material transfer processes. 
There are four types of materiel release: Full Materiel Release (FMR), Conditional 
Materiel Release (CMR), Urgent Materiel Release (UMR), and training materiel release 
(TMR). The definitions and requirements for each are found in the Appendix. 
A FMR allows Program Managers (PM) to field non-developmental items or 
commercial items to soldiers. In a developmental effort, an FMR allows the PM to move 
on to a Full Rate Production (FRP) decision. The three main characteristics being 
evaluated are safety and hazards, suitability, and supportability. There are 32 overall 
activities that can be evaluated. While each of the 32 activities or documents require 
some level of testing or analysis, T&E plays the largest role in the evaluation of activities 
17 (ATEC MR position memorandum) and 18 (ATEC OTA Milestone Assessment 
Report (OMAR) or OTA Evaluation Report (OER)). ATEC is responsible for carrying 
out T&E efforts according to the Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) in order to 
show how the system meets the established requirements identified in the capabilities 
documents. When the PM can demonstrate through T&E that the requirements for an 
FMR are met, the MDA will grant the FMR. 
A CMR is used for various reasons when the conditions for a FMR cannot be met. 
A CMR is appropriate when FRP is not a required part of the program. When the Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE) allows the program to proceed on to FRP with only a 
CMR, a PM is prepared to execute Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and will meet all 
the requirements of the FMR prior to FRP. If an upgrade is scheduled post FRP that will 
meet the all requirements.  
A UMR is used in very specific situations in which the Army requires a capability 
to be fielded rapidly to a unit that has an operational need and is deployed or preparing to 
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deploy for an approved contingency. An UMR is generated in response to an ONS or a 
Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training 
(HQDA G3/5/7) Directed Requirement. HQDA G3/5/7 is the Army lead for determining 
what capabilities the Army is required to have. HQDA G3/5/7 is located in the Pentagon 
and led by a Lieutenant General. An UMR is limited to the specific quantity, location, 
and application as laid out by the approved requirement. The Commanding General (CG) 
of the gaining organization will retain all equipment until operational contingency 
requirements are met. The main focus of UMR documentation requirements is to ensure 
the safety of the users, validate the requirements (e.g., a JUONS or HQDA directed 
requirement), and document and notify the CG (or other requestor) of all known 
equipment, supportability, and sustainment issues with the CG’s acceptance statement. 
Since the UMR is for a specific capability demonstrated in some capacity for a specific 
location, many of the documentation and activities associated with a FRP decision are not 
required here. For example, a completed TEMP (and associated activities) is not a 
prerequisite for a successful UMR. 
A TMR is used by a PM when materiel solutions are to be used by the Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop periods of instructions and 
curriculum. Items released under a TMR may be a prototype, or produced in a manner 
different from normal production or may have not met the requirements for a FMR.  
4. Non-Standard Equipment Transition Process 
The Army has transitioned rapidly developed capabilities into enduring 
requirements once proven valuable in operational theaters. Using Army Directive 2010–
07 to identify which valuable capabilities to maintain and integrate into the Army 
capability baseline, the HQDA G3/5/7 DAMO-CI and TRADOC developed the 
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process (Army Training and 
Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 2012, p. 1). 
The purpose of the Army CDRT process is to identify valuable capabilities that 
have been developed to meet emerging challenges. “The process identifies, through 
operational Army unit input, systems working well in operational theaters and speeds the 
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process to get them into the hands of Soldiers throughout the Army for the long term, and 
reduces expenditures by terminating sustainment funding of systems no longer required” 
(TRADOC, 2012, p. 2). The HQDA G3/5/7 DAMO-CI and TRADOC, quarterly identify 
the best nominated non-standard materiel and non-materiel insertions the Army should 
incorporate throughout the force: “The goal is to significantly reduce the time needed to 
field selected systems or capabilities to the operational Army” (TRADOC, 2012, p. 1). 
Tactical NS-E transitioning to Acquisition Program Candidates (APCs) will be sustained 
in theater using Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding until approved JCIDS 
documentation and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) funding is in place 
(TRADOC, 2012, p. 1).  
The CDRT process was developed to bring programs and systems developed and 
fielded quickly under a steadier funding profile for long-term sustainment. Gaps that 
were not addressed during the initial development and fielding would be addressed once 
the system secured POM funding. 
A capability considered under CDRT can go in one of three directions: selection 
as APC, sustainment of the capability, or terminate the capability. A capability selected 
as an APC has shown to fill a current operational need, is theater-proven, and is 
applicable to the entire Army and future force structures. The program is intended to 
enter the JCIDS process at Milestone B (MS-B) or Milestone C (MS-C), or merge into 
existing programs. The program will begin to submit for program funding in the POM 
but sustain current funding with a bridge resourcing strategy through OCO funding (R. 
Mason, personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 14, 2012). A 
capability selected as ‘sustain’ fills current theater operational need but without broader, 
enduring applications to the entire Army or future force structure. It is recognized as 
equipment for specific theater use only and will be sustained for that theater (R. Mason, 
personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 14, 2012). A capability 
selected for termination does not fulfill its intended function or performs unacceptably. 
The rationale can include obsolescence, better alternatives, or an already active 
replacement activity. The capability can be sustained in theater only if retained and 
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funded by a specific unit (R. Mason, personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, 
December 14, 2012). 
Figure 2 outlines the process a capability must be validated through in order to be 
considered an APC and enter into the JCIDS process. To be eligible for CDRT, a capability 
is required to be operationally mature, in theater for a minimum of 120 days, and have a 
completed a Forward Operational Assessment (FOA). A FOA is conducted by ATEC, in the 
theater of operations where RA are deployed to determine the suitability of the capability. 
The capability can be nominated for consideration by various sources or organizations. The 
candidate list is then assessed and prioritized with lead capabilities identified (R. Mason, 
personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 14, 2012). 
Figure 2.  RA to POR Process Flow  
 
From R. Mason, personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 14, 2012. 
Then the capabilities are recommended for termination, sustain, or APC status 
The decision is validated through and reviewed by a Council of Colonels, the Director of 
the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), HQDA, and TRADOC to ensure the 
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capability meets DOTMLPF-P considerations for current and future Warfighter needs. 
Finally, the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) approves or disapproves the 
recommendations. The approved capabilities move into the JCIDS process (with HQDA 
processing the documentation), bypassing the traditional capabilities based analysis phase 
with either a Capability Production Document (CPD) or Capability Development 
Document (CDD) (TRADOC, 2012, p. 1). 
Once the AROC approves the CDRT recommendations, HQDA (through 
TRADOC headquarters) tasks a TRADOC center or other combat developers to produce 
the required JCIDS documentation. HQDA is critical in ensuring funding is aligned with 
required capabilities across the POM. A system is considered an acquisition program 
once it has an approved CPD, a MS-C decision, and funding in the base budget. 
Capabilities transitioning to APCs will be sustained in theater using OCO funding until 
approved JCIDS documentation and POM funding is in place (TRADOC, 2012, p. 1). 
As of 2012, twelve iterations of the CDRT process have been conducted with the 
thirteenth being processed. Through Iteration 13, the CDRT process has considered 419 
materiel systems and 13 non-materiel capabilities (some more than once). The AROC has 
approved 32 systems for acquisition program status and ten non-materiel capabilities as 
enduring (TRADOC, 2012, p. 2). 
A similar process to CDRT was named the Non-Standard Equipment (NS-E) 
Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) process. While CDRT focused on 
identifying systems as candidates to transition into the JCIDS process with a desired end 
state as a POR, the NS-E AROC process focused on identifying continued funds to 
maintain a capability portfolio (but not necessarily as a POR). The review takes into 
consideration the costs to retain a system, how the system fits into the Army equipping 
strategy, the cost to buy new (either exact or a very similar capability), and best of breed 
considerations (R. Mason, personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 
14, 2012). NS-E AROC recommendations have four options (Retain, Invest, Maintain, or 
Divest) and implementation in a HQDA Memorandum approved by the Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army (VCSA). Retained systems are identified with known quantities and 
will have a resourcing requirement established for the POM. An Invest recommendation 
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allows for further development of the capability (in the form of further RDT&E or 
science and technology (S&T) work) without retaining the equipment itself. The 
capability could also be transferred to another program of record. If a Maintain 
recommendation is given, the Army retains the equipment for operations but will then 
divest of it once available current funding ends, the equipment is no longer needed for 
operations, or there is a cessation of hostilities. A Divest recommendation means that 
equipment must be removed from the inventory even for the current fight (R. Mason, 
personal communication, unpublished PowerPoint, December 14, 2012). 
5. Summary 
This section provided a background on how the DOD addresses requirements 
using the JCIDS process, how the DOD and the Army addresses urgent requirements 
using JUONS and ONS, and why the Army conducts T&E, and finally how the Army 
achieves a MR for new materiel solutions. It is the responsibility of the generating force 
to ensure the operating force is equipped in a safe, suitable and effective manner. The 
acquisition community uses the JCIDS, JUONS/ONS, and the MR process to guide the 
development of materiel solutions. In some cases these processes overlap and in other 
cases large gaps exists that can create risk for Warfighters. This project will analyze how 
the operating force is equipped using each process as the capability moves from a rapid to 
an enduring requirement. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Department of Defense (and more specifically the Army) has compressed the 
acquisition process in order to field capability faster to units deployed in conflict. This 
compression has reduced the amount of T&E that is conducted up front and may not be 
fully addressed in future POR. 
Thirteen years of combat operations, numerous other contingency, humanitarian 
aid, and civil support operations has generated the need for capability to be delivered 
faster than the normal acquisition process can accommodate. While the JCIDS process 
was developed to produce materiel solutions for the services, based on known capability 
gaps, it is a very deliberate process that requires a significant investment in time and 
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resources that may not be available. The services have developed processes to deliver 
capabilities faster than the traditional acquisition process. This has created potential gaps 
and risks associated with delivering rapid capabilities due to the unforeseen length of a 
system life cycle that may not have been taken into account during initial T&E activities. 
Requirements for RA often are not written with enough fidelity to inform the T&E 
community.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to determine the differences in T&E between RA 
and POR. Additional attention will be given to the tradeoffs specific programs, such as 
the Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) Electronic Warfare 
(CREW) and the Dismounted Reconnaissance Sets Kits and Outfits (DR SKO), made in 
terms of cost, performance, and schedule.  
D. THESIS STATEMENT 
This study will explore the effect that the RA environment has had on the Army 
acquisition process during the recent conflicts in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation New Dawn) and in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). In order to 
achieve extremely quick fielding timelines, the Army often utilized the UMR fielding 
process, which reduces the amount of required T&E events. The analysis is designed to 
assess the benefits or drawbacks of using the UMR process (with limited T&E activities) 
for Army acquisition programs. Recommendations will be made for PMs that field RA on 
how to best capitalize on previous T&E activity that can be used as the RA transitions to 
a POR while still realizing rapidly fielding equipment.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were used to guide our data gathering and 
associated analysis. 
Research Question 1: Did the abbreviated T&E requirements in a RA 
environment dilute the important role of the “honest broker” that a T&E team should play 
in an acquisition program? 
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Research Question 2: What are the long-term effects on programs from the 
manner that T&E is conducted to meet RA timelines?  
F. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
While RA programs were able to address urgent needs quickly during asymmetric 
warfare, they may end up being victims of their own success. This study will produce 
“lessons learned” from abbreviated T&E activities. Program Offices can use this 
information to mitigate risk in future research efforts or rapid fielding initiatives. Army 
organizations can also benefit by implementing small changes to their development 
methodologies that will improve the long-term posture and sustainability of new 
capabilities. 
G. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Chapter II will focus on 
detailed literary examination of each research question. Chapter III explores the 
foundational and program specific data related to the research. Chapter IV will present 
our findings with our analytical approach and resultant findings. Chapter V will close 
with our conclusions and recommendations. There are three appendices with backup 
information. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FOUNDATIONAL BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Research for this project began with an intense review of relevant literature. In 
order to form a complete understanding of how the DOD fills capability gaps and 
confirms solutions, information was gathered from a variety of sources that included 
DOD Instructions, Defense guidebooks, Army regulations, Army posture statements, and 
pamphlets.  
Any research involving acquisition requires the study and understanding of both 
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2. DODI 5000.1 lays 
out the overarching policy that all DOD organizations must follow in order to manage 
acquisition programs. It explains what the Defense Acquisition System should do in order 
to provide capabilities required by the National Security Strategy. DODI 5000.2 takes 
this guidance and provides the framework for how PM’s use the Defense Acquisition 
System to manage programs and provide necessary capabilities to the warfighter.  
There were two guidebooks that required study: The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook and The Test and Evaluation Management Guide.  
By design, The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) supports both DODI 
5000.1 and 5000.2. It is commonly referred to as a desk reference for the acquisition 
workforce. The majority of the research for this document came from DAG Chapter 9, 
“Test and Evaluation.” This chapter documents the key ingredients necessary to build a 
T&E program that is effective and meets the requirements of DODI 5000.2. Chapter 4 
was also used in order to reference the Systems Engineering process (Department of 
Defense, 2015). 
The Test and Evaluation Management Guide is another desk reference that 
supports the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) efforts to educate the Acquisition 
Workforce. It is used to facilitate T&E course work, and in the field, to provide a better 
understanding of the T&E process. While the guidebook covered all aspects of T&E, our 
researched delved into Chapters 5, 6, and 10. These chapters focused on the T&E 
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process, Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and Operational Test and Evaluation 
(OT&E) respectively (Defense Acquisition University, 2015a). 
There were three distinct Army Regulations (AR) that were studied as part of this 
research effort: AR 700–142, AR 71–9 and AR 385–10.  
AR 700–142 (Type Classification, Materiel Release, Fielding, and Transfer) 
identifies the policies and procedures for the acceptance of materiel solutions by the 
Army. This regulation is the safeguard that ensures materiel solutions are ready for each 
stage of the acquisition process. Chapter 4 “Materiel Release” covers the required actions 
a PM must complete in order to receive a MR from the Milestone Decision Authority 
(Department of the Army, 2008). 
AR 71–9 Warfighting Capabilities Determination, establishes how the Army 
implements the JCIDS process. Chapter 3 specifically lays out the responsibility of the 
AROC and how requirements are generated by the Army (Department of the Army, 
2009d). To further explore how RA capabilities become enduring capabilities, the NS-E 
and CDRT processes were explored as well. 
A key piece to any materiel solution is the safety aspect of the system. AR 385–
10, The Army Safety Program, is the cornerstone document for safety in the Army 
(Department of the Army, 2013b). This regulation is key to the management of safety 
risks that are identified for Army programs as well as any applicable civilian statutory 
requirements. Additional research to support AR 385–10 was conducted using 
Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 385–16, System Safety Management 
Guide (Department of the Army, 2013a). This document is extremely important to 
Program Executive Offices (PEO) and PMs because it shows how the acquisition 
community should manage safety programs. In particular, Chapter 4 “System Safety for 
Testers and Evaluators” lays out the methodology for PM’s and testers to uncover safety 
problems in order to manage or eliminate them. 
Probably the single most important document researched for this project was 
ATEC Regulation 73–1 (System Test and Evaluation Policy). This documents how ATEC 
supports the acquisition process through T&E activities. More importantly, it provides 
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valuable insight into how the test community thinks and the rationale behind their 
decisions. Much of the information found in this PAM cannot be found elsewhere in 
literature (Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2013).  
Additionally, the 2012 TRADOC Army Posture Statement on CDRT and Army 
Directive 2010–07 were referenced to understand the processes available for a RA to 
transition to a POR. 
B. PROGRAM DATA LITERATURE 
Once our basic research was complete, we decided to examine real world 
examples that moved from a JUONS/ONS to a POR. For this research, we focused on the 
Dismounted Reconnaissance Sets Kits and Outfits (DR SKO) and the Counter Remote 
Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) POR. 
The first set of documents reviewed was the TEMP. The TEMP lays out what will 
be tested and how testing will occur across the life cycle of the program. It includes all 
required tests in order for the PM to meet the goals established in the Acquisition 
Strategy. The TEMP is required and approved at the MS-B (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2015b). 
The second set of documents reviewed was the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP). 
The SEP much like the TEMP is approved at MS-B and is a key document to the 
execution of a program. The SEP details how the technical aspects of a program will 
be executed. The SEP is used as a reference that is continually updated throughout 
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III. DATA  
A. FOUNDATIONAL DATA 
The data presented in this section provides the reader with the required working 
knowledge to understand the T&E requirements and activities within POR and RA. 
1. T&E Requirements for POR 
To establish a control measure for our research, the following question was posed: 
What Test and Evaluation activity is required for Army Programs of Records (POR)?  
During our research, we examined the Defense Acquisition Framework, DODI 
5000.1, DODI 5000.2, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), and ATEC Regulation 
73–1.  
T&E is defined by Test and Evaluation Management Guide as “the process by 
which a system or components are tested and results analyzed to provide performance 
related information” (Defense Acquisition University, 2015b). The information gathered 
during T&E is used to determine the operational effectiveness, suitability, and 
survivability of systems for their intended use. DAU also defines the terms operational 
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. 
Operational Effectiveness (OE): Measure of the overall ability of a 
system to accomplish a mission when used by representative personnel 
in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of 
the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, supportability, 
survivability, vulnerability, and threat. (Defense Acquisition University, 
2015a) 
Survivability: The capability of a system or its crew to avoid or 
withstand a manmade hostile environment without suffering an 
abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2012) 
Operational Suitability (OS): The degree to which a system can be 
satisfactorily placed in field use with consideration to reliability, 
availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, wartime 
usage rates, maintainability, safety, human factors, habitability, 
manpower supportability, logistics supportability, documentation, 
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environmental effects and training requirements. (Department of 
Defense, 2012) 
One of the first things a new program must establish is a Test and Evaluation 
Strategy (TES). The TES (and in some cases, the TEMP) is developed during the 
Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) Phase to describe how T&E will be used throughout 
the execution of program. The TES is written in accordance with the Technology 
Development Strategy (TDS) and the requirements laid out in the Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD). The TES identifies what test events and resources are required during 
the TDS phase.  
The TES is composed of four major sections. Section 1 identifies the purpose of 
the program (i.e., why and what the PM is building) the Materiel Solutions key 
capabilities and interfaces, and any special test requirements the program will require. 
Section 2 of the TES provides the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders both inside 
and outside the program office. The TES lays out how data is collected and disseminated 
during DT and provides an integrated test schedule. Section 3 of the TES contains the 
overall evaluation approaches for both DT and OT. As a part of this process, the 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and prototype testing requirements are identified. 
This section also identifies how and when Modeling and Simulation (M&S) will occur. 
The final portion of this section identifies the test limitations and required future test 
events. Section 4 describes the resources required for testing. It identifies test articles, 
instruments, test sites, test targets, Operational Force Test Support, M&S test beds and 
most importantly, test funding requirements (Defense Acquisition University, 2015b).  
Once the TES is complete, the PM submits the document for approval to the 
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE). If the system is on the OSD T&E oversight 
list, the PM submits the TES through the CAE to Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) T&E for approval. As the program moves toward Milestone B (MS-B), the TES 
evolves into the TEMP (Defense Acquisition University, 2015b). 
A TEMP is required for all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, ACAT IA, II and III 
programs and any under OSD T&E oversight. The TEMP must do five things:  
 Integrate T&E with the overall Acquisition Strategy 
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 Reflect the user’s requirements and describe how these capability needs 
will be tested in DT and OT 
 Document the T&E program for the entire life cycle.  
 Specify personnel, funding, and test range support requirements 
 Be developed prior to MS-B and updates before each subsequent Program 
Decision Review (Test and Evaluation Master Plan, n.d.). 
Development of the TEMP is the responsibility of the PM and the Working-level 
Integrated Product Team (WIPT), both of which will sign the TEMP. The TEMP should 
account for the use of evolutionary acquisition that will not only reduce risk but reduce 
the burden on T&E. The cost and the time required to conduct T&E should be addressed 
in the acquisition strategy and in the TEMP. Accordingly, the TEMP must also discuss: 
 The health hazards and safety issues with the system 
 Support detailed test planning 
 Provide the overall structure and path forward for all future testing, M&S, 
schedules and resources needed to meet the requirements contained within 
published requirements documents. 
Figure 3 provides a sample TEMP table of contents from the Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide in order to show the extensive information included in the document 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2015b).  
There are three types of T&E activities required by regulations to field all POR: 
DT&E, OT&E, and Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). The TEMP will guide each 
of these activities and clearly lay out how the PM intends to prove that the system is safe, 
suitable, and effective. 
As with the TES, the TEMP is submitted for approval to the CAE and on to OSD 
T&E as required by the program’s level of oversight. The TEMP is tailored to each 
requirement and the staffing approval process is different based on the ACAT level. The 
TEMP is a representation of all T&E activities that bring together various stakeholders. 
For this reason, staffing the TEMP can be the most difficult and time consuming of all 
acquisition documents.  
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Figure 3.  Example TEMP Major Topics.  
 
From Defense Acquisition University. (2012). Glossary of defense acquisition acronyms 
and terms. Retrieved from https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/Pages/Default.aspx 
Developmental Testing (DT) is conducted throughout the acquisition process to 
determine if materiel solutions are safe and will meet technical performance criteria. In 
some cases, such as Chemical and Biological Defense, DT will also begin to determine 
effectiveness, survivability, and suitability. DAU defines DT&E as “Any testing used to 
assist in the development and maturation of products, product elements, or manufacturing 
or support processes. Any engineering-type test used to verify status of technical 
progress, verify that design risks are minimized, substantiate achievement of contract 
technical performance, and certify readiness for initial OT” (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2015b). 
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DT can be conducted by the government or by the contractor. Contractor testing 
usually occurs at the vendor facility during the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) phase. Testing can occur on prototypes, board models, sub systems, 
or major components. A brass board is an early prototype that can be used outside the 
laboratory. This testing is designed to determine the maturity of the production process 
and to verify that components are operating consistent with the planned performance. 
Once complete, this data is approved during the Technology Readiness Review. This 
process will provide the government team the information needed to move through MS-C 
and into LRIP.  
Production Qualification Testing (PQT) occurs after MS-C using LRIP assets. 
PQT demonstrates the “integrity of the system design over the operational and 
environmental range in the specification” (Defense Acquisition University, 2015b). If 
software is involved, testing occurs on the delivery version. PQT informs the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) prior to making the FRP decision. DT&E occurs across all 
phases of the Acquisition process as demonstrated in the graphic below (Figure 4). 
Figure 4.  Examples DT&E Activities across Phases of the Acquisition 
Life Cycle.  
 
From R. James, personal communication, January 9, 2015. 
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Operational Testing and Evaluation is required by Title 10, United States Code, 
Section 2399 for all covered systems. A covered system is a system that is a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and is a major system that fulfills a mission need. 
OT&E is further defined as “the field test, under realistic combat conditions, of any item 
of (or key component of) weapons, equipment, or munitions for the purposes of 
determining the effectiveness and suitability of the weapons, equipment, or munitions for 
use in combat by typical military users; and the evaluation of the results of such test” (10 
U.S. Code Section 2399). 
Operational Testing (OT), as stated by the Test and Evaluation Management 
Guide (Defense Acquisition University, 2015b), is “the degree of satisfaction of the 
user’s requirements expressed as operational effectiveness and operational suitability of 
the new system.” In the case of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 
equipment, this may also be determined in part, through DT. The level of operational 
effectiveness determines the answer to the basic question: will a system work in its 
intended environment? Effectiveness is the measure of performance of a system when it 
is used by end users in an operational environment using current Techniques, Tactics and 
Procedures (TTP), doctrine, and threat scenarios. 
Suitability is used to measure the interoperability of the system when considered 
from a transportability and Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) stand 
point. OT may not extend long enough to fully determine RAM. Results from OT and DT 
can be combined to gather sufficient RAM data. Suitability ensures that the system can 
be deployed, used and maintained in the field. 
Survivability is the measurement of a system’s vulnerability and survivability. 
These are measured through LFT&E. LFT&E is required by all ‘covered’ acquisition 
programs. For LFT&E, the term ‘covered’ applies to a system that users occupy in 
combat, any conventional munitions and missile program, a conventional munitions 
program where the acquisition of a million rounds is planned, any modification to a 
current covered system, or any system designated for oversight by Director Operational 
Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). LFT&E is conducted to measure how well the system 
responds to live fire and also how well the crew survives.  
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There are some key facts to remember regarding OT&E. 
 OT&E is conducted throughout all phases of the acquisition process. 
 The DOT&E is the OT&E approval authority for all MDAPs 
 OT&E is conducted by an independent Operational Test Authority (OTA). 
In summary, T&E informs the MDA of the system’s ability to meet the 
requirements as prescribed by JCIDS requirements documents. All acquisition programs, 
regardless of ACAT, require independent T&E. The level of testing will be determined 
by the MDA and the OTA. The TES will determine the personnel and logistics of T&E. 
Once the program transitions from MS A to MS B, the TES will evolve into the TEMP. 
The TEMP will then layout the T&E process the program will follow. DT testing will 
determine if the system performs as required, meets user requirements, and if a system is 
ready for OT. OT, which is performed by the government using an independent OTA, 
will determine if a system is effective, suitable, and survivable. Additionally, ‘covered’ 
systems require LFT&E to verify the survivability and lethality. 
2. T&E Requirements for Rapid Acquisition 
When the Army has a capability gap that cannot wait for fulfillment by the normal 
acquisition process or if the gap is non-enduring, the Army uses RA to close the gap. In 
order for a commander to utilize the solution, it must be evaluated by ATEC.ATEC will 
determine its capabilities and limitations as well as ensuring it is safe for Soldiers to use.  
The Army ONS process is used when an operational commander identifies a 
capability gap and is either deployed, deploying, or a high priority unit. According to AR 
71–9, there are three types of ONS: those for a deployed unit, those for deploying unit, 
and an ONS from other units. This is also how priorities are established for each ONS. 
The highest priority ONS is a deployed unit in a named operation. The second highest 
priority ONS is a unit deploying to a named operation. The lowest priority ONS is from 
all other units that have recognized a capability gap that requires a materiel solution 
(Department of the Army, 2009d). 
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Regardless of the type, Commanders follow the same ONS process. Once 
initiated, an ONS formally enters the process through the ECOP. The ECOP database is 
located at https://www.ecop.army.smil.mil on the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNet). ECOP requires access permission that can usually be granted in a 
few days. The user must first identify the gap and provide information on what missions 
cannot be accomplished. Next, the user provides justification for the requirement by 
providing rationale on what impact of not fulfilling the ONS will have on mission 
accomplishment. The unit must also demonstrate what efforts were used to meet the 
mission requirement with existing equipment and organization. The unit will then define 
how the equipment will be used, who will use it, and the Organizational Concept for 
employment. The unit will define how many systems are required, how they will 
complete training on the system, additional support needed, and recommend a source of 
supply or solution set. Once the request is complete, it can flow through the ONS/ 
Equipment Sourcing Document (ESD) approval process. Figure 5 from the ECOP Pocket 
guide illustrates the ONS/ESD staffing process (Department of the Army, n.d.). If the 
unit is deployed, the request is routed through the deployed unit’s chain of command to 
the ASCC. Non-deployed units will submit requests through their major command. If the 
ONS is approved by the respective ASCC, it moves on to HQDA G3/5/7 for validation. If 
validated, the ONS moves to HQDA G8 for resourcing. If resourcing is available, the 
validated request is forwarded with funding to the acquisition community for action. If 
funding is not available, the requirement, must appear before the Army Requirements and 
Resourcing Board (AR2B). The AR2B is responsible for prioritizing and validating 
resources for current requirements and the reprioritization of resources as required. The 
AR2B primarily deals with resourcing within the year of execution and is also 
responsible for notifying Congress on resource changes that are required by law. Once 
funding is approved by the Army Budget Office (ABO), it is assigned to a PM. The PM 
accepting the requirement and resourcing, moves forward with an acquisition plan to fill 
the capability gap (Department of the Army, 2009). 
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Figure 5.  ECOP ONS/ESD Staffing Process. 
 
From (ECOP, n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.g8.army.mil 
During the DA 3/5/7 evaluation period, the Army Staff evaluates the ONS for 
broader applications across the department. If the determination is made that the ONS 
affects a broader audience, DA 3/5/7 will release a Directed Requirement.  
Directed Requirements (DR) are authored by HQDA G-3/5/7 Capabilities 
Integration Division (DAMO-CI) and approved by the VCSA. Once approved, the DR 
appears in front of the AR2B for resourcing. DRs cannot be used to develop new 
technology. The DR will only provide capability outside the traditional JCIDS process 
and only if the unfilled capability gap endangers lives or seriously impacts mission 
accomplishment. 
Once the PM receives an ONS or DR and resources, the process of fulfilling the 
urgent requirement begins. To provide the required capability, there are several activities 
that must occur. The PM, working with ATEC, the user, and the MDA, must produce 
documentation as required by AR 700–142. These documents consist of a Safety 
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Confirmation, a Capabilities and Limitation Report, a User Acceptance Memorandum, 
and finally, an UMR is approved by the MDA (Department of the Army, 2013c). 
The PM is responsible for funding and requesting support from ATEC. Once 
ATEC receives the request, it is assigned to an ATEC System Team (AST). Once 
assigned to an AST, a chair is assigned with the primary responsibility of leading the 
T&E effort. The AST Chair will determine how the ONS/DR will be evaluated. The AST 
will use the ATEC Rapid Acquisition Initiative flow chart (shown in Figure 6) to assist in 
the management of the test effort (Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2004). 
Once the PM has provided a solution and the AST has developed a test plan, the 
effort can be moved into the evaluation portion of the process. A Safety Release is 
required prior to a test event and once testing is complete, a Safety Confirmation is 
required to field equipment.  
A Safety Release is required prior to placing equipment into the hands of soldiers. 
AR 385–10 states “A safety release must be obtained from Headquarters, ATEC or in 
accordance with guidance provided in DA PAM 385–16 whenever solders and involved 
with an event” (Department of the Army, 2013a). 
The Safety Release is developed and written by the U.S. Army Evaluation Center 
(AEC) Test Manager having primary responsibility. The Safety Release has several key 
parts. First, the release covers a specific event i.e., Operational Assessment (OA), 
Limited User Test (LUT), or OT. It also covers a specific time period with definitive start 
date and has an expiration date. The Safety Release should identify the test participants 
that will use the equipment, the level of risk the soldiers will be exposed, and the overall 
safety risk of the system. The safety release addresses each piece of equipment and each 
component, evaluating against the requirements laid out in Military Standard (MIL-STD) 
882E for risk. It is important to remember a safety release is a temporary document used 
for a specific event.  
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Figure 6.  RAI and Urgent Materiel Release Process. 
 
From U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command. (2013). System test and evaluation 
policy. ATEC Regulation 73-1. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation 
Command. 
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A Safety Confirmation is used during the normal course of acquisition and is 
required by AR 385–10 prior to each Milestone. It is also required during RA prior to an 
UMR decision. AR 385–10 defines a Safety Confirmation as “A separate document or 
part of the OTA evaluation report, OTA Milestone evaluation report, OTA Assessment 
report, or Capabilities and Limitations Report (CLR) that provides the DT or OT agency 
findings and conclusions, and states whether the specified safety requirements are met” 
(Department of the Army, 2013b). The purpose of this document is to evaluate the risk 
that the system poses to soldiers, ensure those risks are mitigated or removed, and in 
cases where residual risks remain, provide the user with a risk assessment to allow the 
user to manage the risk. ATEC collects this information through the evaluation of 
Technical Manuals, DT results, and observations during OAs. The Safety Confirmation is 
one of the key documents that is required in order to receive an UMR from a MDA. 
Table 1 shows when a Safety Release or Confirmation is required.  
Table 1.   Safety Release, Safety Confirmation Comparison. 
 
From U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). Type classification, materiel release, 
fielding and transfer. Army Regulation 700–142. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
the Army. 
A CLR is the culmination of DT and OT events that occurred informing the 
gaining command and the materiel release authority what the system can and cannot do. 
The AST Chair and the PM evaluate the requirement as written in the ONS or DR. After 
evaluation, the AST Chair develops a Test Concept Plan, which is approved by ATEC 
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CG and presented to the PM for funding. DT to support the CLR is conducted by various 
Test centers and OT is conducted by Operational Test Command (OTC). The AST chair 
and the PM or program sponsor will determine the type of operational testing based on 
the complexity of the system. At a minimum, some type of OA will occur to place the 
capability in the hands of soldiers. The evaluation will provide key inputs into the CLR.  
The CLR consists of nine key areas: purpose, executive summary, mission need, 
system description, data sources, test limitations, observations, employment 
considerations, and recommendations.  
The Purpose paragraph helps explain the reason for the evaluation providing 
context to both the user and acquisition community. The executive summary provides a 
brief overview of the CLR and its contents. The mission need paragraph lays out what 
capability is required and should reference the ONS number and identified unit or the 
pertinent DR. The system description paragraph lays out the system and how it is 
intended to work. It should also state how it should be used in its intended environment. 
The data sources and test limitations paragraphs tell what tests were conducted, both OT 
and DT, and what limitations where present during testing. The observation paragraph 
lists all the capabilities of the system and the current warfighter gaps the system fills. It 
includes all capabilities and limitations observations as well as safety, interoperability, 
training, supportability, and survivability observations. The CLR also includes 
recommendations to both the user on how to employ the capability, and to the acquisition 
community on how to make the system more suitable and effective. 
Once the CLR and the Safety Confirmation are in place, the PM must gain 
acceptance of the capability from the Gaining Command. The Gaining Command will 
provide an acceptance memorandum, usually signed by a general officer or a senior 
executive service civilian equivalent. The memo should cover the items accepted and the 
quantity accepted. If the acceptance memo is for a Conditional Materiel Release, the user 
acceptance memo will cover the duration of the acceptance. Once accepted, the PM is 
ready to seek an UMR from the MDA.  
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A Materiel Release (MR) is granted much in the same way a milestone decision is 
granted. The MR authority will review the documentation for completeness, then make a 
determination to grant the MR. The procedure for all MRs (Full, Training, Conditional, 
or Urgent) are governed by AR 700–142. The authority to grant a materiel release 
depends on the materiel involved (Department of the Army, 2013c). 
MR authority is granted in accordance with AR 700–142. There are several 
release authorities that can grant a MR depending on the type of materiel involved. 
The CLR and the Safety Confirmation are released simultaneously and once 
coupled with a gaining command acceptance memo, are used by the MDA to grant a 
UMR. The UMR is granted for a specific event, specific quantities, and to specific 
commanders. Once the UMR is granted, the PM can then equip the user with the 
prescribed capability. After fielding, the capability is monitored, with ATEC updating the 
CLR as needed. HQDA and TRADOC will determine if the fielded capability will 
become enduring and transition to a program of record or disposed of once the capability 
is not required. 
3. UMR and FMR Comparison 
The following tables (Tables 2–5) compare the different activities required for a 
POR and associated FMR versus a shorter term RA and associated UMR. Some of the 
FMR requirements may also factor into PEO leadership taking on the responsibility to 
field an RA, as well as a GC being satisfied with and accepting the new capability. These 
are notated with a “PD” for “program dependent” since not all programs will require the 
same T&E efforts. However, if certain activities usually required for FMR are required 
for GC acceptance under an RA effort, they may be an abbreviated version or may also 
still show that risk exists in certain areas, but may be acceptable to the GC. Additionally, 
an area of great variation may exist within the suitability category where an FMR 
requires adherence to the detailed and long-term program TEMP and TES, and an UMR 




Table 2.   Materiel Release Safe Hazards Release Requirements.  
FMR - Safe Hazards FMR UMR 
Supporting safety office certification x PD 
TSG HHA x  
Environmental statement x  
Airworthiness statement x PD 
SSRA for residual hazards x  
Surface or Weapon danger zone x  
Final hazard classification x  
NRC license x  
Army Fuze Safety Review Board Certification x  
Energetic materiels qualification x  
Ignition System Safety Review Board Certification 
and Standardization Agreement 
x  
Safety review of technical manuals x  
Results of safety inspections and analyses x PD 
Software safety statement x  
After U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). Type classification, materiel release, fielding 
and transfer. Army Regulation 700–142. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Army..  
Table 3.   Materiel Release Supportability Requirements.  
FMR – Supportability FMR UMR 
Supportability certification—will address support 
materiel, end item, and software 
x PD 
USATA supportability statement on TMDE or ATE x  
TC designation x  
SDDC TEA transportability x  
Army logistician assessment x PD 
Supporting statements for COEI and ASOIE x PD 
Software supportability statement x PD 
After U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). Type classification, materiel release, fielding 




Table 4.   Materiel Release Suitability Requirements.  
FMR – Suitability FMR UMR 
ATEC MR position memorandum x PD 
ATEC OMAR or OER x PD 
CIO/G-6 AIC statement based upon AIC completion x PD 
Certificate of Networthiness x PD 
DIACAP certification statement x  
Communications Security Logistics Activity 
statement for COMSEC supportability 
x  
CAPDEV training assessment (statement of adequacy 
of institutional training support) 
x  
Software suitability statement x  
Quality, reliability, availability, and maintainability 
statement, including service or shelf life assurance, 
Ammunition Stockpile Reliability Program, and 
ammunition surveillance procedures 
x PD 
After U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). Type classification, materiel release, fielding 
and transfer. Army Regulation 700–142. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Army.  
Table 5.   Materiel Release RA UMR Requirements  
UMR FMR UMR 
User requested/HQDA directed  x 
Safety and Health data sheet with a risk assessment 
for the materiel system 
 x 
Air worthiness statement (if applicable)  x 
EOD supportability statement (if applicable)  x 
PM Request for acceptance from the GC or requestor  x 
GC acceptance statement  x 
After U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). Type classification, materiel release, fielding 
and transfer. Army Regulation 700–142. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Army. . 
B. PROGRAM RESEARCH DATA 
The data presented in this section provides the reader with two specific examples 
of programs that have started as RA, made the transition to POR, and the T&E activities 
required to make that transition. 
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1. Dismounted Reconnaissance Sets Kits and Outfits 
The DR SKO is an ACT III program assigned to the Joint Project Manager for 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Contamination Avoidance (JPM NBC CA) and the 
JPEO CBD. The JPEO CBD is responsible for the “Research, Development, Acquisition 
Fielding and Life-Cycle Support of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
Defense Equipment, Medical Countermeasures and Installation and Force Protection 
Integrated Capabilities Supporting the National Strategies” (Joint Project Manager for 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Contamination Avoidance [JPEO CBD], n.d., Mission 
Statement). JPM NBC CA is responsible for the development, production, integration, 
testing and fielding of NBC detection, obscuration, and reconnaissance systems (JPM 
NBC CA (n.d.), Mission Statement). The acquisition objective for this program was for 
440 systems at a cost upward of $500 million. 
The DR SKO is used by all services to conduct dismounted CBRN 
reconnaissance. The system is a mixture of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) and 
Government off the Shelf (GOTS) detection, sampling, personnel protection, and 
decontamination hardware (overview shown in Figure 7). The system is designed for 
world-wide deployment, packaged to meet individual service needs.  
The primary mission of the DR SKO is to identify the presence of CBRN and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materiels (and their precursors), and can 
characterize the environment. Information gathered by this system can provide critical 
information to the commander on the presence and use of CBRN weapons. In his 
government blog, the DR SKO Systems Manager, Mr. Edward Conley, described the 
system as one that, “provides a modular baseline suite of modern detection, 
identification, and protection equipment to support the ever changing threat environment, 
especially for toxic industrial hazards” (Edgewood ChemBioCenter, 2012). The genesis 
of the DR SKO came from an ONS generated by units experiencing capability gaps 
during OEF. U.S. forces encountered multiple threats from Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
(TIC) and Toxic Industrial Materiels (TIM). 
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At the time, traditional CBRN organizations were equipped to conduct CBRN 
Reconnaissance against traditional warfare agents but lacked the ability to conduct site 
assessment, conduct confined space operations, identify TIC/TIMs, and had limited 
capability inside buildings in urban environments. After fulfillment of the ONS, the Joint 
Force, understanding the value of this new capability, submitted a JUONS to increase the 
capability from 16 to 40 systems. This evolution in capability over time is illustrated in 
Figure 8. With demand for this capability increasing, Army Combat Developers began 
development of JCIDS documents.  
Figure 7.  DR SKO Layout. 
 
From JPEO CBD. (2014). Dismounted reconnaissance sets kits and outfits [Fact sheet]. 
Retrieved from 
http://jacks.jpeocbd.army.mil/Public/FactSheetProvider.ashx?productId=447  
The early acquisition strategy attempted to capitalize on the heavy use of existing 
COTS or GOTS technology to enter into a MS-C decision with a production CPD. Ms. 
Anne Hise, the Lead System Engineer (Edgewood ChemBioCenter, 2012) stated, 
“Originally, the strategy included initial entry into the acquisition process at the Low-
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Rate Initial Production decision. The lack of independently verified data to support 
evaluation of key performance parameters drove a change in strategy” The acquisition 
team, unable to verify many manufacturer claims and match those claims to Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) and Key System Attributes (KSA) laid out in the CPD, 
re-grouped, moved the program back to a MS-B, and converted the CPD back to a CDD.  
Figure 8.  DR SKO Pre Program Evolution.  
 
From JPEO CBD. (2009). DOD chemical biological defense advanced planning briefing 
for industry (APBI). Retrieved http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/Default.aspx?pg=851 
The Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense authored a CDD and the JPEO 
CBD, the MDA for this program, issued a MDD on July 6, 2010. The MDA approved the 
DR SKO for entrance into the acquisition cycle at MS-B and also approved the 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) on March 30, 2011. Once approved, the DR 
SKO could enter into the EMD phase. Two major test events occurred during EMD: 
Engineering Developmental Testing (EDT) and OAs. 
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EDT occurred at multiple Test Centers across the United States. Chemical testing 
took place at Dugway Proving Grounds and the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, 
trace explosive testing took place at Indian Head, MD and the Electronic Proving 
Ground, and radiation testing occurred at White Sands Missile Range. The EDT validated 
equipment to verify manufacturer claims and to meet the requirements of the CDD. 
Two OAs where conducted: one for ground based operations and one for 
maritime operations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) tested the ground based 
version in an urban environment at Ft. Hood, Texas, and the United States Navy (USN) 
tested the maritime version under an excursion off the coast of North Carolina. 
The EDT and OAs provided the required data to move DR SKO to the next 
acquisition phase. A CPD was developed and a MS-C decision took place during the 
second quarter of 2013. With the MS-C decision in hand, the DR SKO program moved 
toward the FRP Decision.  
To meet the requirements of the FRP decision, additional testing was conducted. 
The DR SKO program conducted Performance Qualification Testing, Logistics and 
Maintainability Demonstration (LMD), and Multiservice Operational Testing (MOT).  
DR SKO tested three areas as part of PQT: Transportability and Safety, System 
level RAM and Vapor Sampling Collection Demonstration. Transportability testing was 
used to assess system safety and verify modification made post EDT (Department of 
Defense, 2008). The systems were exposed to drop testing, on course vibration, rail 
impact, and a host of environmental testing. RAM testing operated components of the 
system for a total of 515 hours. Certified civilian operators conducted operations for 14.5 
hour mission cycles consistent with the DR SKO Operational Mode Summary/Mission 
Profile (OMS/MP) (JPM CA, December 2012). The final PQT event was the Vapor 
Sampling Collection Demonstration. This event measured the ability of the equipment to 
collect a sample and maintain the sample until delivered to a laboratory for analysis. 
The DR SKO conducted a Logistics and Maintainability Demonstration assessing 
and validating the maintainability, repair ability and the system logistics. The demo lasted 
one month in order to test systems configured for the Army, USN, and USMC. The 
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purpose of the Logistics Demonstration was to determine system supportability, validate 
the Technical Manual, verify the Maintenance Allocation Chart, and ensure the 
completeness of the System Support Package. The Maintainability Demonstration 
measured the adequacy of built-in test, the tool kit, the provided test kit, and the 
measurement of both corrective and preventive maintenance times. 
The final test event was the MOT. The MOT provided data to determine the 
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the DR SKO. The MOT was evaluated by 
the U.S. Army Operational Test Command (OTC) against realistic operational scenarios. 
Each service conducted OT in environments and scenarios relevant to their mission. 
Once testing was complete, the MDA granted an FRP decision during the second 
quarter of Fiscal Year 2014 and full rate production started immediately. The program is 
still in production with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for all services scheduled for 
third quarter Fiscal Year 2016. Figure 9 shows the DR SKO Integrated Master Schedule 
(IMS) from the DR SKO TEMP. 
Figure 9.  DR SKO IMS from DR SKO TEMP.  
 
From JPM CA. (2012). Dismounted reconnaissance sets, kits, and outfits (DR SKO) test 
and evaluation master plan (TEMP). Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD: JPEOCBD. 
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2. Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic 
Warfare  
The primary Army vehicle mounted Counter Remote Control Improvised 
Explosive Device Electronic Warfare system is named Duke (AN/VLQ-12). The 
following information is derived from the CREW Duke SEP (PEO IEW&S, 2013) and 
TEMP (PEO IEW&S, 2012). 
The CREW Duke (or Duke Countermeasures Set) is a second generation 
Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) set used to jam Radio Frequency (RF) threats and is 
comprised of a complete, end-to-end RF system (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 1–2). The 
system chassis is self-contained with external power connectors for use with batteries, 
vehicle power, or generators, and performs the receiving, processing, and response 
transmitting function (PEO IEW&S, 2012, pp. 1–2). All of the end user controls 
necessary to operate the system are user-accessible with simple switches to change 
operational modes (PEO IEW&S, 2013, p. 14). 
Duke systems are needed to provide commanders with the capability to 
meet urgent mission requirements, provide vital force protection 
against RCIED threats, and reduce the risk of serious injury and loss of 
life to the Warfighter. During full spectrum operations, the Duke 
system is a combat power enabler. The CREW Duke system provides 
commanders the freedom of movement/action required to concentrate 
and disperse combat power to keep the enemy at a disadvantage. (PEO 
IEW&S, 2012, p. 1–1)  
The system protects ground forces operating in convoys or single vehicle 
operations against signals that trigger RCIEDs. 
The CREW Duke system is represented by two configurations (V2 and V3) and 
are deployed in theater on all designated tactical and non-tactical vehicles. The system 
has demonstrated adequate and reliable protection against priority RCIED threats (PEO 
IEW&S, 2012, pp. 1-1 – 1-2). 
The CREW Duke TEMP details the need for CREW growing out of the surge of 
U.S. casualties as a result of roadside bombs, or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
during OIF and OEF (2012). “IEDs have been the leading cause of U.S. Casualties, and 
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RCIEDs represent a very large portion of these casualties” (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 1-5). 
CREW systems in general (and specifically CREW Duke for the Army) have 
dramatically reduced the effectiveness of RCIEDs (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 1-5). As 
CREW Duke systems were rapidly deployed, there was a significant reduction in RCIED 
related casualties. 
Constant evolution of the RCIED threat required specific changes to the Duke 
system in order to maintain relevancy. Multiple JUONS identified a critical need for 
increased capabilities that were provided by upgrading the Duke V1 to the Duke V2 and, 
finally, to the Duke V3 configuration. In August 2010, the CREW Duke system was 
designated as an ACAT II Program (PEO IEW&S, 2012, pp. 1–6). 
As an urgent need RA, the CREW Duke system was specified by a 
Performance Based Specification (PBS) via a competitive bid process. 
In order to maximize flexibility for the respondents, the System 
Architecture and Interface Control were not specified by the 
Government. Instead, the respondents were free to use the architecture 
“as is” and interface control method which would best allow them to 
meet the requirements of the PBS. An interface control document was 
required to be submitted by the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) to define the physical interfaces. This defined interface control 
is a governing feature for any future upgrades or changes. (PEO 
IEW&S, 2013, p. 23) 
The program office conducted numerous T&E events of the CREW Duke system 
prior to full fielding. Some of these events were in addition to the requirement of fielding 
a RA with the desired end state of becoming a POR in the future. Each CREW Duke 
configuration underwent DT. DT evaluated aspects of mission equipment, the electrical 
power source, and integration into a prime mover. AEC conducted a formal Capabilities 
and Limitations (C&L) Test prior to the initial deployment, which employed priority 
threats in a representative operational environment (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 1–6). The 
AEC, as the independent developmental and operational evaluator, is a principal T&E 
IPT member and chairs all RAM scoring conferences. AEC supplied documentation 
assessing how well the CREW-2 systems met the CPD developed by the Combat 
Developer (CBTDEV), including performance validation data, FOA feedback, and 
provided analysis in a CLR. AEC monitors key tests and prepares the Abbreviated 
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Operational Evaluation Report (OER-A) and Materiel Release Position Memo to support 
the FMR (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 2–2). 
As described in the CREW-2 Duke TEMP (authored by PEO IEW&S), the 
following list documents the testing conducted prior to being designated a POR to 
include: 
 System Testing: OEM implemented CREW system test program to 
ensure that compliant Duke systems of the highest quality were delivered 
to the Government. This included a thorough range of First Article Tests 
(FAT), to include a Reliability Demonstration for each phase, and a 
follow-on AEC-evaluated test at Yuma Proving Ground (YPG), AZ. The 
tests conducted by AEC utilized operationally-placed threats (2012, p. 1–
6). 
 FAT: conducted by the OEM at the contractor’s facilities and witnessed 
by the government. The following tests were conducted for each CREW 
Duke version: high/low temperature, solar loading, shock/vibration, sand 
and dust intrusion, rain/blowing rain intrusion, ice/ freezing rain intrusion, 
humidity/salt fog/fungus intrusion, electromagnetic interference (EMI), 
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), and reliability demonstration (2012, 
pp. 1-6 – 1-7). 
 Software Functional Qualification Test (SFQT): to stress the software 
and ensure a stable software baseline acceptance (2012, p. 1–7). 
 Reliability demonstration: OEM conducted Reliability Demonstrations 
for each version to verify that the Duke systems met the minimum 
reliability requirements with a confidence level that equals or exceeds the 
requirement specified in the CPD (2012, p. 1–7). 
 Safety and Health Hazards: initiated by the OEM and evaluated by the 
Communication-Electronics Command (CECOM) Safety Office and the 
former Developmental Test Command (DTC) covering all aspects of the 
Duke system to ensure all hazards related to installation, transportation, 
operation, maintenance, and storage of Duke systems were eliminated or 
minimized. The Program office also required the contractor to develop a 
Safety Assessment Report (SAR) and complete the Health Hazard 
Assessment (HHA), as part of the safety release and safety confirmation 
process (certified in 3Q FY07 for Duke V2 and 2Q FY09 for Duke V3) 
(2012, p. 1–7).  
 Training: evaluation was conducted to determine that all critical tasks 
related to system operation, maintenance, and support could be performed 
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in the specified environment by soldiers in the field, with minimal training 
(2012, p. 1–7). 
 Transportability: engineering analysis of the host platforms 
incorporating the CREW Duke system was conducted to determine 
potential transportation problems and to ensure transportability 
requirements were met (2012, p. 1–7). 
 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3): conducted during EMI 
testing during FAT and simulated RF environments operating during all 
field tests (2012, p. 1–8). 
 Reliability and Maintainability: A selected number of Duke pre-
production units were tested in accordance with the Reliability Test Plan 
(RTP), developed by the OEM (2012, p. 1–8).  
 Performance: CREW Duke performance was evaluated to determine if it 
met the requirements of the PBS and CPD for the CREW-2 system(s). 
This requirement was continuously tested, throughout the life of the 
system, including evaluated tests for each phase and continuously repeated 
for the numerous load set modifications required to stay relevant against 
new and emerging threats during all phases of the CREW Duke program. 
A fully developed traceability matrix from evaluation domain to Critical 
Operational Issue (COI) to Measure Of Effectiveness (MOE) to Measure 
Of Performance (MOP) was not developed until later in the program and 
initial performance was judged strictly against KPPs and KSAs identified 
in the requirements documentation. ATEC issued a Duke V3 CLR in 3Q 
FY10 (2012, p. 1–8). 
 Mobility: Dimensional, weight, performance and center-of-gravity data 
were measured and compared with the constraints of the host vehicles to 
demonstrate the Duke system’s ability to keep up with the supported unit 
and support the maneuver force. Mobility/Vibration road tests were also 
conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD. The objective of this 
testing was to verify that the Duke system is capable of withstanding 
transportability stresses in the field and operating satisfactorily during and 
after exposure to mobility stress and vibration, as would be encountered in 
vehicle movement over rough terrain (2012, p. 1–8). 
As recognition that the CREW Duke program was transitioning from RA to POR, 
program documentation was structured to capture all previous T&E events as an attempt 
to highlight any critical information that was still required. Due to the fact that the CREW 
Duke system started out as a RA, a significant portion of the technical review and audit 
processes found in a traditional acquisition program was abbreviated. CREW Duke 
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system acquisitions were based on a theater ONS and supporting urgent requirements, 
which mandated fielding to both OIF and OEF as quickly as possible. Consequently, PM 
CREW analyses performed during the early CREW 2.0 system development and 
acquisition (i.e., production and fielding) resulted in a reduced set of technical data 
requirements. To complete the transition to a POR, the Army evaluator identified follow-
on T&E events that were required after fielding: system activity monitor test and 
Logistics/Maintenance Demonstration (L/M Demo) (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 3-1). 
The objective of the system activity monitor test is to evaluate the self-monitoring 
capability of CREW Duke system and the length of time the system can operate on 
vehicle power (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 3–5). The L/M Demo was conducted at CREW 
University in Edgewood, MD, during the Summer of 2012, with a nondestructive 
disassembly and re-assembly of a production-representative system using all associated 
support materiels. This event provided data regarding adequacy of maintenance planning, 
System Support Package, Life Cycle Support Plan (LCSP), maintenance documentation, 
and training (PEO IEW&S, 2012, pp. 3-4, 3-5–3-6). 
Test limitations were also identified. “Not all threats or emplacements were 
exercised during field testing, however this was mitigated by focusing on the highest 
priority threats as determine by theater and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)” 
(PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 3-4). 
Reliability growth was not a factor during the initial design and fielding of the 
CREW Duke system. It was initially intended to be a RA to fill an immediate need, but 
its long-term importance became apparent as fielded quantities increased. There is 
insufficient testing scheduled at this time to demonstrate reliability growth and, because 
production of the system is complete, little value would be realized by the development 
of a reliability growth plan unless significant reliability problems arise (PEO IEW&S, 
2012, p. 3-5). 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. Primary Finding 1—Differences between RA and POR for T&E 
The differences between a RA and a POR in terms of T&E can be boiled down to 
three key areas: requirements, purpose, and intended use.  
The first key difference is the determination of requirements. Requirements may 
be the single most important factor when embarking on a T&E effort. They determine 
what to test, they aid in deriving how the test should be designed, and what test the 
results should be measured against. 
POR follow a specific requirements process that, once complete, identifies a very 
specific materiel solution. This requirement is born in one of several strategy documents 
that the joint community conducts a Capability Based Assessment against. The remaining 
gaps manifest themselves in the form of an ICD. The ICD identifies the requirement in a 
very broad manner, allowing the acquisition community to determine ways to address the 
identified capabilities gaps. Meanwhile, the Capability Developer begins work on a 
requirements document that will identify KPPs and KSAs. These KPPs and KSAs will 
determine what the system needs to do in operational terms. This should provide the test 
community and program management team with the information required to develop a 
test and evaluation strategy to support the acquisition strategy.  
A RA program is executed from a much smaller data set with far less analysis. 
The analysis could occur at the tactical level, service level, or at the COCOM level. This 
occurs only to solve an existing or emerging problem. It does not take into account the 
long-term implications or capability gaps outside of the immediate need. This 
requirement lacks the fidelity of a KPP and lacks the uniformity that the JCIDS process 
provides. ATEC Regulation 73–1 address this problem as follows: 
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One of the key deficiencies in the RAI process is the Joint Use 
Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), Operational Needs Statement 
(ONS), and the abbreviated format known as the ten liner. These 
documents vary greatly in quality and for the most part do not express 
substantive operational requirements and associated key performance 
parameters or critical technical parameters. As such, it is incumbent 
upon the AST chair to use all means to bridge this requirements gap 
and produce a CLR that provides stakeholders with sufficient 
information so that readers can draw operational effectiveness and 
suitability conclusions or seek additional data. It is critical that these 
customers know as much as possible about the equipment, including 
the associated technical and operational risks inherent in its 
employment, as well as any unknowns. (ATEC, 2013) 
The starting point of T&E is the requirement. The clarity of the requirement 
ensures testing can deliver quantifiable results that can be used to measure suitability, 
survivability, and effectiveness. POR have a clearer T&E path based on sound 
requirements, where RAs requirements are less clear and require interpretation by the test 
community and the program management team.  
The second key difference between POR and RA is the purpose of the testing. For 
a POR, testing is conducted to determine if KPPs and KSAs are met. In RA, an 
evaluation takes place to determine the capabilities and limitation of the system. In the 
case of POR, if a test event results in a threshold requirement not being met, the program 
could face cancelation. This means the PM must attempt to address shortcomings and 
deficiencies. This test-fix-test approach allows the PM to achieve KPPs without 
compromising the program. This information is used to support an acquisition decisions 
at key junctures. Each phase of the process has key tests that are performed to support 
key decisions.  
On the other hand, the RA goes through limited DT and an OA that evaluates the 
system against stated requirements, and against each of the DOTMLPF-P domains. This 
evaluation is designed to inform stakeholders of the performance capabilities and 
limitations of the proposed solution. It does not support an acquisition decision because 
(normally) the materiel solution has already been procured. The information from this 
evaluation will be used by the commander to support user acceptance, and by the MDA 
to support an UMR. 
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The final difference between a POR and RA is the intended purpose. A RA is 
developed for a very specific capability in a very specific environment, and for a specific 
period of time. When a UMR is granted, it is only for the specific use identified. The 
Safety Confirmation covers the materiel for a limited use in a specified environment. If a 
UMR is granted for use in one Area of Operations (AOR) for a commander, it cannot be 
transferred to another commander in another AOR without updating the UMR. The 
Safety Confirmation is very specific in this regard. An FMR focuses on the system’s full 
safety and hazard elimination/acceptance, suitability, and supportability. Above all, the 
involvement of ATEC to carry out the activities identified in the TEMP requires an 
extensive T&E program (increasing program cost and schedule) in order to demonstrate 
effectiveness, survivability, Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) 
compliance, reliability, supportability, and interoperability. Knowing these T&E goals 
early allows a PM to better focus and to conduct systems engineering efforts that result in 
the best solution for the Soldier. For a POR, an FMR is signed as part of the acquisition 
process leading to a FRP decision and, once fielded to the Services, it can be employed 
anywhere the Services need it. It means the system has been tested for suitability in all 
AORs and can be employed by all commanders. If a unit requires this capability, it can 
request this equipment through command channels. The FMR, unlike the UMR, is good 
for the life of the equipment unless updated by the MDA.  
The key differences between POR and RA when it comes to T&E are the 
requirements generation, the intended purpose of the T&E activities, and the purpose of 
the equipment being used.  
2. Primary Finding 2—Effect of Abbreviated T&E Requirements 
Our research has indicated that there are two primary effects of abbreviated T&E 
requirements. The first is time required for fielding, and the second primary effect is risk.  
In an RA environment, time is the most critical element. Time represent lives lost, 
or possibly mission failure. The luxury of time may not be available to a PM responsible 
for an RA. In these cases, the PM and the Test community are required to provide a 
solution, ensure the solution is safe, and evaluate its capabilities and limitations. This 
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may provide materiel solutions to warfighters with a less than ideal capability but in time 
to affect the immediate capability gap. This exposes the user to risk and can be a source 
of unseen cost increases. In the case of the DR SKO, some of the RA systems remained 
in the field for over a decade until the POR systems replaced them. The effect of 
abbreviated T&E is the ability to provide stop gap until the capability is no longer needed 
or until the long-term solution can be put in place. Given the service life of equipment 
and its lifetime enormous cost, T&E ensures that our investments are protected. In most 
cases, RAs do not have that luxury. The DR SKO and the CREW Duke were needed to 
fulfill immediate capability gaps. The threat of WMDs and IEDs pose significant 
challenges to commanders. Abbreviated T&E for the CREW Duke RA allowed the 
capability to be fielded rapidly and save lives immediately by providing commanders a 
capability until the POR elements could catch up. The DR SKO pre-program versions 
provided commanders with an upfront ability to detect the presence of a variety of 
harmful materiels that had previously gone undetected. The rapid nature of the T&E 
conducted provided the warfighter with a capability that reduced gaps and bought 
commanders the necessary time required for the POR to become established. 
The second element is risk. When the T&E process is compressed to meet 
shortened timelines, many tests that normally occur are omitted. The pre POR versions of 
DR SKO did not conduct a significant amount of DT. In the case of RA, the services are 
left to manage any residual risk. The assumed risk is much broader than injury or 
inability to completely fill a capability gap. In one example, the risk comes in the form of 
unmet requirements. Due to the need for a compressed timeline, the PM for the DR SKO 
RA program used manufacturer claims in assist in procurement decisions. The DR SKO 
POR, on the other hand, used DT to verify those manufacturer claims and then 
disqualified those that did not meet the defined requirement.  
Some of the risk also occurs in the form of increased cost of employing RA. One 
increase in cost of RA can be attributed incomplete RAM data collected. The CLR 
provides some RAM information, but it is mostly limited to observations during the OAs. 
In this case, the claims of the manufacture were also used for the DR SKO RA program. 
In contrast, the DR SKO POR used the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
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Scorecard (JPM CA, December 2012) to guide the program through the process of 
collecting RAM data. The POR evaluated RAM factors over 515 mission hours (JPM 
CA, December 2012). The RA simply lacked the time required to test to this level of 
fidelity. The lack of RAM data provided an incomplete picture for the service. Without 
complete RAM data, the mission suitability of the RA is questionable. 
Additionally, the Service’s logistics systems are not set up to support RA in the 
same manner they support POR. RA require their own support mechanism that may 
require a complete Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) package. The execution of 
maintenance is moved out of the commander’s organic prevue and into the hands of CLS 
maintainers. This CLS may require additional outside personnel that require additional 
logistics support, such as security, facilitates, and berthing placing additional strain on 
units. CLS support usually requires a higher funding level from the PM as well. The DR 
SKO POR conducted a Logistics Demonstration during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 
2013 that documented each of the 12 Integrated Product Support Elements. Once 
complete, the PM team had the information required to determine the suitability of the 
POR. This information was not available to the RA program and created the need for 
CLS.  
The final element of risk that is not accounted for in RA is the cost of system-
level replacement. PORs have a known shelf- life accounted for in POM cycles. The DR 
SKO CDD established clear Ownership Cost metrics with a threshold of $564 million 
and an objective of $508 million (JPM CA, December 2012). The life cycle of an RA 
may be unknown and may require upgrading and refresh multiple times throughout its 
mission life. The main concern of an RA is to ensure a capability reaches the warfighter 
with ownership costs becoming a secondary factor. 
A subset within the risk element relates to when a system successfully fills a 
requirement and is identified for long-term use through either the CDRT process or the 
NS-E AROC process. The system can be identified as an APC or at least the recipient of 
further funding. If classified as an APC and required to enter the JCIDS process, the 
program office will need to generate all of the mandatory acquisition documentation that 
may have been not required under a RA, including the T&E activities. The risk is that the 
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T&E activities may reveal system shortcomings due to the limited amount of time 
available to conduct systems engineering design and analysis on the original system. 
While the capabilities were provided to the Soldier that needed it in the short term, a full 
T&E program may reveal complications in sustaining it in the Army inventory for the 
long term.  
The effects of an abbreviated T&E process allow the commander to gain time in 
the filling of a capability gap, but also adds elements of risk that would not be present in 
standard POR with complete testing protocols. The services must weigh these risks 
during the requirements determination and validation process used to approve RI. 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH FINDINGS  
1. Secondary Finding 1—Benefits and Drawbacks for CREW 
IEDs became a very significant issue during OEF and OND, from both an 
operational stand point as well reducing national moral. The U.S. and Coalition ground 
forces were caught off guard by the widespread and successful use of IEDs (specifically 
RCIEDs) and needed to compensate for the asymmetric warfare they encountered. The 
Army required a solution that could address the wide spectrum of threats and, needed it 
quickly. The CREW Duke system was the solution to that gap. 
The CREW Duke system was specified to meet performance against a set of 
known threats through a PBS as opposed to defining detailed hardware and software 
requirements. This method allowed vendors to propose solutions they had in a 
production-ready state. Instead of having to take the time (that was not available) and 
additional resources to develop a solution from scratch, contractors were able to propose 
solutions that met the performance requirements without having to adhere to strict 
government guidelines. For example, the incorporation of a reliability growth plan was 
not a required factor; neither was the requirement to utilize a modular design to increase 
the ease of upgrades in the future. In addition, the associated software and firmware was 
not required to be written to allow for ease of modification in the future. This allowed for 
fielding of a large number of CREW Duke systems over several years throughout OEF 
and OND to address the RCIED threat. From a T&E perspective, only the final system 
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performance against the defined set of threats was evaluated. Again, this allowed for a 
quicker solution to be fielded against an immediate gap, but did not allow the Army to 
have full visibility on software inefficiencies, all possible compatibility risks, or 
performance limitations for future RCIED threats. 
The CREW Duke program did benefit from the high visibility (both in the media 
and within the DOD) due to the cost in lives the RCIEDs were taking. This also created a 
demand for many working groups and organizations (such as JIEDDO) that were 
established up to combat the IED problem. CREW Duke program benefited from this 
visibility since multiple avenue to secure funding for un-programmed costs. For example, 
of the 19 data sources used to establish CREW Duke’s ability to meet suitability 
requirements, 17 of them were generated from the L/M Demo (PEO IEW&S, 2012, pp. 
D5 – D9). The L/M Demo occurred in the summer of 2012, after fielding and designation 
as a POR (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 4-1). Many of these unplanned costs resulted from 
developing and adapting the supportability strategy in real time. As the requirement for 
more systems grew and as the posture on the ground in theater constantly shifted, the 
expected lifetime of the system grew. 
As noted in the CREW Duke TEMP, the L/M Demo was taking place after full 
fielding of the system had already been achieved. Several system considerations affecting 
the long-term life cycle of the CREW Duke system (e.g., laptop availability for software 
updates or the correct levels spare parts) were not part of the system-level evaluation 
earlier in the program. For example, laptops were not part of the system description (PEO 
IEW&S, 2013, pp. 14–19) so the continued success of the system relies on the 
availability of hardware outside the purview of the CREW Duke program. Also, the 
OEM reliability demonstration was able to show the system level reliability of the CREW 
Duke (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 1–7) but did not allow for identification of sub-system 
components that could lower system reliability. The total life cycle costs were not 
evaluated early in the program because speed of fielding was the most important priority 
in having a successful program. While success was achieved, conducting the L/M Demo 
earlier would have allowed for better planning for the total life cycle cost in preparation 
for transitioning to a POR. 
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Additionally, the Data Source Matrix identifying the requirements traceability 
from COI to MOE/MOP to KPP/KSA was not complete until the publishing of the 
CREW Duke TEMP in June 2012. The evaluation framework and dendritic were defined 
in the TEMP as activities not yet achieved in support of the CREW Duke FMR decision 
(PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 3–1). Since performance against the RCIED threat was the main 
criteria for successful and quick fielding, this did not allow the Army the time to fully 
evaluate the requirements traceability and only required the L/M Demo to come later in 
the program. While many lessons learned have already been applied to the maintenance 
and supportability activities of CREW Duke, the transition to a POR may have required 
less follow-up T&E effort if the traceability was conducted earlier. 
Overall, the quick fielding of the CREW Duke program was a great benefit to the 
Army because it was able to effectively combat the RCIED threat. The transition to a 
POR does require following up with several T&E activities to complete the forward 
planning for the entire life cycle of the system and fulfill all the requirements for FMR. 
Specifically for CREW Duke, this included the L/M Demo to evaluate the “logistical 
capability required to sustain the system” as well as the system activity monitor test used 
to evaluate the system’s self-monitoring capability (PEO IEW&S, 2012, p. 3–5). 
2. Secondary Finding 2—Benefits/Drawbacks for DR SKO 
The DR SKO POR got a head start in the acquisition process because of the work 
done during the RA effort. The TIC Protection and Detection Equipment (PDE) ONS 
opened the door by fielding 16 systems in 2004. An additional 40 systems were added in 
2010 after a JUONS was submitted. The Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Radiological 
System II (JNBCRS II) (sometimes referred to as the JUONS II kit) replaced the TIC 
PDE ONS systems. The JNBCRS II remained in the field until they were replaced by DR 
SKO POR systems. This provided the acquisition community, as well as the user 
community, with six years of data that could be evaluated and analyzed and determine if 
the systems were filling capability gaps. Throughout this period, the PM did not remain 
idle.  
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As with any RA, the PM was required to obtain a CLR and a Safety 
Confirmation. This allowed the PM to conduct required system level safety testing. An 
OA was conducted that allowed users to use the system in controlled conditions where 
measurable data was collected. Several instruments were tested at Dugway Proving 
Grounds using Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) and TICs. The intent was to secure a 
CLR and Safety Confirmation, but as a byproduct, volumes of data were collected to 
support the future POR. They further developed the RA by containerizing the system in 
Quad Con transportation containers. This design was proven successful at another OT 
conducted with users at Ft. Hood, Texas. During this same period, the PM funded ATEC 
to evaluate the RA system against the emerging requirements being codified in the CDD.  
The DR SKO program clearly benefited from its RA predecessors in several 
areas. Due to the RA work, the need to conduct and Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was 
alleviated. An AOA is designed to ensure that all other materiel options have been 
considered and cannot fulfill the existing capability gap effectively and efficiently. This 
is a lengthy process by design that could take one to two years from start to finish. In this 
case, the MDD determined that the Analysis of Materiel Solution met the requirements of 
an AOA.  
Additional benefits were realized from previous data mining. The DR SKO 
TEMP lays out four clear efficiencies gained from the work completed during the POR:  
1. Reduce the MOT test locations from three separate locations to two 
separate locations (land and maritime) (JPM CA, December 2012). 
2. Reduce the MOT schedule by completing a standalone RAM Test during 
the PQT (a MOT test schedule reduction of 300 hours) (JPM CA, 
December 2012). 
3. Reduce the Log Demo from 4 participating Services to 2 (USA and 
USMC) (JPM CA, December 2012). 
4. Reduce the scope of Vapor Sampler testing from six TICs to one TIC 
(JPM CA, December 2012). 
The benefits from the RA to the DR SKO POR are evident. What is not as clear 
are any drawbacks that were present. During the course of research for this project, it 
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appeared that the DR SKO, through an excellent program acquisition strategy, was a 
model for how to transition a RA to a POR. 
The major concern with this method is how the POR requirements were 
developed. It is impossible to determine from this perspective, but the question should be 
asked: “did the RA drive the requirement or did the capability gap drive the 
requirement?”  
Any time a program is this successful, it is easy for the requirement developers to 
default to standards that exist regardless of their relevancy. In the case of the DR SKO, 
the requirement was written to a civilian standard, not to an operational requirement. 
While the missions of civilian Frist Responders and DOD CBRN Reconnaissance 
Personnel have similarities, they are inherently different. The dynamics of combat and 
the countless variables encountered are not accounted for in the civilian standards used. 
In fairness, development of DOD unique standards is very difficult, costly, and time 
consuming. This may have been a tradeoff the combat developers made early.  
C. SUMMARY 
There are clear differences between the test and evaluation of a RA and a POR. 
The rigor that is required to support a POR is not present in a RA. This is done to get 
something that will immediately impact a mission or saves lives to the field as soon as 
possible. In essence, the RA framework shifts risk from the program manager to the 
commander. We evaluated the CREW Duke and the DR SKO programs, which are both 
models of how programs can be transitioned from a RA to a POR. In both cases, 
capturing data during RA activities that will support the POR is key in shortening the 
timeline of the POR. Program Managers should remain cognizant of transition 
opportunities when developing RA. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, SUMMARY AND 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We began this research by asking two questions: Did the abbreviated T&E 
requirements in a RA environment dilute the important role T&E should play in an 
acquisition program? What are the long-term effects on programs from the manner that 
T&E is conducted to meet RA timelines?  
The results of our research exposed a very different result to the first research 
question than expected. We found that the role T&E plays in RA is not diluted at all and 
is in fact extremely important. An RA, by design, requires a shortened timeline to deliver 
equipment to warfighters in order to saves lives and ensure mission success. T&E in this 
case serves a very important role during the production of a Capability and Limitation 
Report and a Safety Confirmation. The PM, working with the test community, must 
determine what testing will take place and in what form. For RA, the PM can conduct all 
types of testing to ensure the materiel solution meets the requirements stated. The user 
trusting the PM and T&E process is asked to accept the capability and its associated risks.  
In some cases, these RA programs transition into POR. The Army uses the CDRT 
process to transition RA to POR. CDRT allows for the entrance of capabilities into the 
later stages of JCIDS process. Regardless of where the capability enters the process, 
some or all of the test data may be usable for the POR. 
The long-term effects of T&E activities on RA programs can be measured in both 
cost and schedule. The challenge for the Services, PM, and test community is to conduct 
RA testing in a manner that allows for the data to be usable for a future POR. This may 
require additional resources initially, but could be a precursor for future savings. Many 
lessons were learned from the explosion of RA fielding activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The Army Acquisition community was forced to be agile in a time-constrained 
environment to meet the threat of asymmetric warfare. The capability and process to 
move this quickly cannot be forgotten at the risk of not being able to meet the next 
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unforeseen threat. A process similar to CDRT or the NSE-AROC is recommended to 
become part of the recognized acquisition process in order to codify a path for 
capabilities to move into the Army inventory. These capabilities can be recognized as 
important but may have come from outside the traditional development and acquisition 
process (such as a COTS device or a repurposed piece of equipment). A critical piece of a 
permanent, successful CDRT-like process would be identifying a required set of T&E 
activities. This needs to be done prior to consideration for moving a capability into the 
Army inventory so that precious, quick-reaction time is not lost when a capability needs 
to move to the field immediately. 
Additionally, it is recommended that the Army Research and Development 
(R&D) community proceed with integration of new technologies at the system level for 
near term deployment while keeping in mind the potential effects on total life cycle costs. 
When a technology matures past a lab based prototype, testing efforts beyond the 
baseline performance validation are required to prove out the measures of suitability and 
effectiveness. The R&D community must identify a transition path for new technology to 
reduce the risk of moving too far down a path without a clearly identified end state. This 
work up front will place new capabilities in a better position for a smoother and quicker 
transition to the Warfighter, without the need to back track to T&E events that were 
initially determined unnecessary. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The amount of time RA remain in the field until they are retired, or transition into 
POR should be examined by the Services and Congress. The shear amount of JUONS 
and ONS that have been approved over the last decade and remain in the field 
demonstrate a need to understand what their residual effects are on the Warfighter and the 
Operational Army. A study of how this has impacted the Acquisition process should also 
be studied. We have almost a generation of acquisition professionals that were present in 
a pre-war environment. The impact of the last decade may reveal some key lessons 
learned to better support the process in the future 
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APPENDIX. MATERIEL RELEASE COMPARISON 
The Materiel Release comparison table from Army Regulation 700-142 
(Department of the Army, 2013, pp. 18–20), lists the requirements for materiel 
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